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RACISM'S PAST AND LAW'S FUTURE
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
Pour Charybde dviter tu tomberas en Scylle,
Si tu ne sais nager d'une voile Atout vent.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses what may be called the problem of law's
association with evil by arguing a point Ernst Cassirer made in The Myth of
the State:
The self-preservation of the state cannot be secured by its
material prosperity nor can it be guaranteed by the maintenance
of certain constitutional laws. Written constitutions or legal
charters have no real binding force, if they are not the expression
of a constitution that is written in the citizens' minds. Without
this moral support the very strength of a state becomes its
inherent danger.2
Legal scholars, lawmakers and, increasingly, the general public seem to
place ever-increasing hope in the potential of law and legal theory, and of
enforceable uniform international legal standards. Many appear to believe
that identifying and enacting laws and a legal framework that correspond
worldwide to human rights will solve the age-old problem of legalized
barbarism. The historical propensity of courts, even in democratic states, to
legitimate and enable racist policies provides compelling evidence that the
current level of faith in law is misplaced.
This Article argues the limitations of law and legal theory, contesting
the view that on their own they will have more than minimal impact on
society and even on courts. No matter how good they are in conception;
how correctly they embody contemporaneous understandings of universal
human rights; or how flawlessly they may be phrased to connect the
signifier of legal language to the signified concepts that language purports
to represent, law and legal theory can only be a small part of the elements
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. My thanks to Professors David Dyzenhaus and
Mayo Moran for the stimulating conference they organized on the Chinese head tax case; to Professor
Deborah Brake for her assistance with United States constitutional law doctrine; and to my dean, David
Herring. for financial support for the writing of this article. Unless otherwise noted, translations are
mine.
1. JOACHIM DU BELLAY, LES REGRETS, XXVI, 49 (Robert Laffont 1876) (1558), I have
modernized the spelling from "Pour Charybde eviter tu tomberas en Scylle, / Si tu ne svais nager d'une
voile h tout vent."
2. ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 91 (Doubleday Anchor Books 1955) (1946).
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that would fashion judiciaries into a bulwark against ideologies and
practices of repression.
Part I of this Article introduces my thesis. Part II situates the problem
of law and legal theory, and the dangers of the contemporary world's
excessive faith in them. Part Ill discusses the "Chinese head tax case,"
current litigation, in Canada involving the relation of law to racism in a
modem constitutional democracy. This case figures in the debate which
arose after the Second World War as to whether courts can ensure the rule
of law and undermine politics of repression by adopting a non-positivistic
methodology. That methodology would include identifying as non-law, and
therefore as unenforceable, legislative enactments the judiciary deems to be
subversions of what law should be, or, in other words, enactments the
judiciary deems evil.
Part IV examines in greater depth what one may call the debate about
evil law that Nazism and Stalinism spawned in the aftermath of the Second
World War. That debate resulted in a rejection of theories of legal
positivism in favor of a return to older perspectives of natural law theories.
The proponents of natural law methodology purported to offer a solution to
the judicial propensity to enable terror that had reached new heights in the
massacre of populations by Hitler.
Part V deals with the present-day import of the positivism-natural law
debate, including the question of how the common-law versus civil-law
legal systems of the western world figure into the debate. In particular, it
argues against the view that common-law attributes provide greater
potential for the judicial maintenance of the rule of law than do civilian
legal attributes. It also argues that judicial methodology largely is
uncorrelated with the substantive justice ofjudicial decisions.
Finally, the Conclusion situates the postwar debate in terms of law's
capacities and its future, arguing that the postwar focus on judicial
methodology and theory as a significant avenue for ensuring a humane rule
of law is unlikely to bear fruit because a debate internal to law, to
identifying the best laws, the best legal theories, and the best-defined
judicial mission and methodology, cannot affect more than a fragment of
the life of the law and of people, given the importance of the non-legal
arena's influence on the pragmatic meanings of law in society, on the allimportant "constitution that is written in the citizens' minds.",3 As Cassirer
explained, the inchoate values the citizens hold to be valid, however
transitory and vulnerable they may be to subversion from without and

3. Id.
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within, nevertheless constitute the law the courts will implement according
to contemporaneous societal, institutional and individual beliefs.
II. BETWEEN LEGAL THEORY'S SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
The history of racism is one of many historical arenas that provide
compelling evidence to confirm Cassirer's thesis. Racism has been part of
a long and consistent story of law's capitulation to the dominant views and
ideologies of society, however much at odds they have been with what one
might consider to be legal requirements of a most basic, minimal and
fundamental nature. Law's performance generally has been dismal: the
judiciaries of nation after nation throughout time have enabled governments
to discriminate against, persecute, and even massacre portions of
populations.
Judicial compliance with political ideologies of discrimination,
persecution, and murder have not been limited to countries in which the
judiciary may be said to have lost its independence within the governmental
structure of the state. Moreover, even where the judiciary operated within
an authoritarian government of merciless vengeance against dissenters, such
as in Hitler Germany or Vichy France, where one might suppose that the
judiciaries' enablement of terror stemmed from weakness and fears of
reprisal, compelling evidence suggests a very different conclusion: namely,
that judicial compliance with national ideology was enthusiastic
and
4
factor.
motivating
primary
a
been
having
fear
with
inconsistent
The history of law's enablement of racism, both through statutory
enactments and judicial decision-making, casts into doubt today's
widespread belief that human savagery will be eradicated by good laws, and
by making good laws universally accepted and enforceable. This belief
historically is unjustified and illusory. It also is tragically dangerous
because it undermines the goal of ensuring human rights and dignity that it
seeks to attain.
Legalized racism illustrates many problems of law and legal theory that
are inherent in law and legal theory, not historically contingent. We do not
need to go outside the United States to study racism's penetration into the
entrails of a western constitutional democracy. This article examines it
elsewhere, however, because it is illuminating to keep in mind how racism
4. See generally INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH

(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans.. 1991); Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a
Constitutional State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. I (1998) Ihereinafter
Legalization of Racism] (noting the recent academic trend that suggests the populace and judiciary
supported the regime's behavior).
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of one kind or another, in endlessly renewed and ever creative incarnations,
has typified the history of humanity around the globe, and how law
generally has been its servant, not its opponent.
The history of law and legal theory also has had remarkably constant
attributes of its own: notably, a dogged insistence on law's power to reform
humanity, to ensure that civilization triumphs and eradicates barbarism; and
an overweening hubris in suggesting that law and legal theory can contain
the solution within themselves, and that the goal of ensuring respect for
fundamental human rights and human dignity worldwide can be attained
through law and legal theory.
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, legal theory and philosophy
suggest that they contain a remedial potential which in fact they lack, and
necessarily must lack, to the extent that they fail to incorporate the inchoate
values of individuals and institutions in society, the phenomenon Cassirer
calls the "constitution that is written in the citizens' minds." 5 It may be as
much by omission as by commission that legal theory suggests an illusory
promise of remedial capacity. Omitting to address explicitly its own
limitations in scope of application suffices to convey a greater promise of
remedial effect than legal theory can fulfill.
In accordance with Cassirer's insight, the practical potential of legal
theory, methodology and philosophy's influence diminish in the measure
that uncertain and often unascertainable human views and understandings
are driving forces behind judicial interpretation and application of law.
Consequently, the solution to law's historical participation in perpetrating
evil is not to be found in legal theory or in legal systems. At the least, the
role of system and theory are minor players in the story of law's potential
for evil, as in law's potential for preventing evil.
Ronald Dworkin has written that "propositions of law are true if they
figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural
due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the
community's legal practice."6 With Cassirer's instruction as the context,
Dworkin's point would mean that propositions of law will be deemed true
in and for a legal community so long as they meet the enumerated
community-determined criteria. This is no antidote to law's connection
with evil, because it means that propositions of law which would be deemed
true and valid can stray very far from anything resembling what we might
like to associate with the rule of law, if the community's practice generates
inhumane legal interpretations.
5. CASSIRER, supra note 2.

6. RONALD DwoRKN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
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It is with this point of departure that the present Article addresses two
arguments: the debate about whether evil law should be considered to be
law at all; and the suggestion others have made of recourse to common-law
principles of equity as a solution for changing the historically recurring
judicial practice of implementing ideologies of repression and racial
discrimination when legislative organs of the state have mandated the same
as law.
The position of this Article is that neither a natural-law perspective nor
a common-law focus on equity (or on its continental European civilian
counterparts, such as "general principles"/"general clauses") 7 can
systematize a solution. They may be very helpful tools if and when the
"constitution in the citizens' minds" causes them to be used for good, but
whether they will be so used depends on the individual and institutional
values momentarily in place when enacted law is implemented.
To the extent they are advocated as the basis of legal argument and
persuasion in particular situations, such as an avenue that in apartheid South
Africa might have led to judicial eradication of apartheid had they been
applied more pervasively and insightfully (and courageously), as will be
discussed below, they may be most valuable suggestions in practice at
given moments. 8 Accordingly, the point of this Article is not to deny their
usefulness or value, nor to deny the importance of humane judicial rulings.
The latter have meant the difference between life and death to the
disempowered throughout the worst periods in history, including in
apartheid South Africa, Nazi Germany, Vichy France, and Mussolini Italy.
The point, rather, is to suggest that natural law and principles of equity,
like all other legal principles and perspectives, will be colored and defined
so differently at individual moments in history, that it is not they, but,
rather, the values of the individual and institutional legal actors that will
determine whether law is a force for or against humanity at any given
moment in history. Consequently, the practical effect of legal theory,
methodology, and philosophy is limited to the here and now, and is of
minimal usefulness for guiding the way law will be implemented in the
future.
By this I mean not just that judges in the future may choose to ignore a
natural-law perspective or principles of equity (or their civil-law
equivalents), but also that, even if we were able to set a humane theory of
law in stone as obligatory for a nation's judiciary, the ways in which legal
theory, philosophy, and methodology will be understood and implemented
8. General principles from the French "principes gdniraur" and general clauses from the
German "Generalklauseln." See discussion infra Part Vi.
9. See discussion infra Part V.
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will be a function of all that Cassirer meant when he said "the constitution
that is written in the citizens' minds," such that they may become a force
for evil no matter how carefully one crafts concepts today as a prescription
for use tomorrow.
A primary purpose in drawing attention to, and insisting on, the
inherently weak correlation between justice on the one hand, and
established legal theory and methodology on the other, is that recognizing
the reduced role of law, legal theory, and the systematization of guiding
principles of legal methodology may enhance clarity and thereby improve
the efficacity of our choice of measures in trying to achieve the goal of
perpetuating or establishing a humane rule of law.
-It
is of interest to note the emphasis on educating children in La Pensie
et l'action,9 the book by Ren6 Cassin, principal drafter of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,' 0 who placed great faith in the power of law
to change the world." He devoted his life to the furtherance of his fervent
belief in the power of legal standards, and in their potential to prevent the
barbaric period he had witnessed in Europe from recurring. Nevertheless,
the end of the preface to his book implies a recognition that the preservation
of human life and dignity does not depend on law or legal theory, no matter
how humane in intention or obligatory in nature. It depends, rather, on the
determinative power over the future of what is in the minds of the citizens;
hence, the preface ends by speaking not of law, but of education:
It is the educators of all of the nations who are responsible for the
youth of tomorrow. Theirs is the mission to sow in the soul of
the young the seed that, in blossoming, will triumph over
nationalisms and prepare the harvest of tomorrow: the human
patrie [nation/homeland].12
One may object that legal theorists do not pretend that their proposals
offer complete or absolute answers, and that they do not deny the
importance of the inchoate variables Cassirer underscored with his idea of
9. REN[CASSIN, LAPENS'E ET L'ACTION (1972).

10. But see Mary Ann Glendon, Diaries of a Forgotten Framer, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 277,
277 (2001) (book review) (noting that the drafter of the first draft of the Universal Declaration was John
Humphrey).
II. For a powerful depiction of Cassin and his colleagues' faith in law's power to eradicate
human barbarism, see Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1153,1153-82 (1998).
12. Alfred Kastler. Preface to RENE CASSIN, LA PENSEE ET L'ACTION I1 (1972) ('Ce sont les
iducateurs de toutes les nations qui sont responsables de la jeunesse de demain. C'est 6 eux
qu 'incombe lamission de semer dans IVdime des jeunes le grain qui en germant I 'emporterasur les
nationalismes et preparer lamoisson de demain: lapatrie humaine.").
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the "constitution that is written in the citizens' minds." Hence, one might
respond, theorists work within that realm in which logic may have at least
some influence, without pretending to greater influence than their work will
have, but nevertheless trying to use their energies constructively to
contribute to the goal of law's becoming however much a force of progress
as it can. One also may object that my .focus on the unreliable nature of
advance solutions through theory or systematization is both nihilistic and an
unnecessary restatement of the obvious, and that legal theorists reasonably
may choose not to express the issue precisely because they are not
pretending to act in more than such space as is available for pragmatic
influence, however small or large that space may prove to be.13
My purpose in challenging the likelihood that legal system, theory, or
methodology will correlate more than minimally with perpetuating a
humane rule of law stems from believing that most writers and readers of
legal theory do not take into account sufficiently the very small role the
field wields in determining the rule of law. Still worse, in my view the net
effect of post-Second World War legal debate has been to contribute to an
unwarranted and dangerous faith in the power of law, legal theory, and
methodology to combat socio-political-ideological evil."
Excessive faith in law, legal theory, system, and methodology is
extremely dangerous because it is a formula for conferring insufficient
attention to those factors that might enable us to heighten the probability of
correlating judicial adjudication with justice. The postwar focus on judicial
methodology has caused an unfortunately irrational faith in its power. This
13. Here my justification in insisting on the small role legal theory and methodology play in
social reality is similar to my justification of Isaiah Berlin when a philosopher expressed bewilderment
at the success of Isaiah Berlin, commenting that Berlin surely had gotten the most credit of any
intellectual in history for doing no more than restating the obvious. (Conversation with Adolf
Grtlnbaum, ca. 2002). While this may be so, the expression of the conceptually simple truths Berlin
repeated throughout his life's work, the "restatement of the obvious," was, and continues to be,
enormously important because of the prevailing tendency to ignore just those truths, however obvious
they should be, to the potentially irremediable detriment of society. I think in particular of Berlin's
central point in connection with value pluralism: that not all good things are compatible; that their
harmonization is not just inaccurate, but is logically incoherent. This simple truth is at the root of much
historical injustice and human suffering, and also is a challenge to the potential of legal theory.
14. For further examination of this point, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Politicizingthe Crime
Against Humanity: The French Example, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 677 (2003) [hereinafter Crime
Against Humanity]. On the reaction of international legal scholars between the two world wars to place
similarly irrational faith in the power of law, see Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair":
European Nationalism and the Modernist Reneiwal of InternationalLaw, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1792
(1993); see also Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 260. 260 (1940) (describing the historically recurrent, irrational but "inveterate tendency to
stick to ...assumptions and to suffer constant defeat from experience rather than to
change ... assumptions in the light of contradicting facts .... As the League of Nations was a failure, let
us have another League.").
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focus draws attention away from identifying domains of analysis and action
that would be more influential in affecting the institutional and individual
the
values of society, those values that are strongly correlated with whether
5
law.'
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rule
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a
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courts are
The temptation to place faith in law and legal theory's potential for
ensuring a humane rule of law is great because the prospect of
acknowledging that the inchoate plays the dominant part in law's reality
means acknowledging how overwhelming the odds are against progress,
despite the dramatic urgency for law to do better in the future than it has
done in the past, and despite the huge stakes involved-life and justice.
On the one hand, excessive faith in law's potential will heighten the
chances of injustice to the extent it lessens vigilance in other socio-cultural
areas. The more legal actors adopt an illusory faith in systemic attributes of
law, the greater the likelihood that they will be lured into remaining at a
superficial understanding of legal developments.' 6 As a society's changing
values affect the reality of law, it may not be clear that anything is
changing, especially if the texts of enacted law are unchanged.
On the contrary, the judicial tendency is to proclaim continuity even as
judicial interpretation alters the valence of textually immobile law. To
follow the sixteenth- century poet, du Bellay, when seen from the outside, a
law still may look like a thing of utmost beauty, like a justice-furthering
ideal that may have inspired it originally, while its meaning may have
become transformed into something deadly, like the inside of a tomb: "Qui
les voit par dehors ne peut rien voir plus beau, / Mais le dedans ressemble
au dedans d'un tombeau.'', 7 This is the phenomenon one legal scholar so
aptly has termed "ideological drift.' 8 Accordingly, the Scylla is that legal
theory's promise is illusory unless one maintains a perspective as to the
limits of its potential. To lose sight of those limitations is to lose sight of
the need for deconstructing the externals of law in order to see the living
reality beneath the shell.

15. Indeed, they also are the factors that determine how judges interpret and understand the
legal theory and methodology.
16. See Crime Against Humanity, supra note 14, at 708-09 (describing the effect of society's
narrowing perspective on law's meaning in the context of crimes against humanity).
17. Du BELLAY, supra note 1.at XC, 113. I have modernized the French spelling. The
original is "Qui les void par dehors ne peult rien voir plus beau, / Mais le dedans resemble au dedans
d'un tombeau."
18. See J.M. Balkin, IdeologicalDrift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 869,
871 (1993) (stating that ideological drift means "legal ideas and symbols will change their political
valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts"); see also J.M. Balkin, The Footnote. 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 275, 277 (1989).
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On the other hand is Charybdis: the inevitably dim hope of remedying
law's propensity to participate in injustice because of the difficulty of
The endless
influencing the inchoate factors Cassirer underscores.
variables, lack of precision, incessant flux, and vulnerability to subversion
of the "constitution that is written in the citizens' minds" nevertheless must
be the terrain of our attention because, however tenuous and elusive of
definition they may be, it is they which are a sine qua non for maintaining a
humane rule of law.
The impetus for corrective-remedial legal theory is the desire to
progress into a less savagely barbaric and inhumane future, to wrest law
from the forces of evil and to create in and from it a bulwark against
injustice, human suffering, and mass murder, all of which law historically
has been implicated in enabling and legitimating only too often. If one
confronts the realization that the best that legal theory can do, even if
successful in getting itself adopted by judges and lawyers, is to make a very
small difference in the construction of the "constitution that is written in the
citizens' minds," one would have to look beyond theory, system, and
methodology to the ever-contingent array of factors that are not amenable to
prediction or to control. Until and unless legal theory can manage to do
that, its role will be compromised by the failure to do so, increasing, rather
than decreasing, the propensity of law to partake in repressive ideology.
III. THE CHINESE HEAD TAX CASE
The Chinese head tax case, ongoing in Canada as of this writing,
illustrates the continuing relation of law to racism in a modern
constitutional democracy, and provides a springboard for a discussion of
law and legal theory's potentials and limitations. 19 The case arose from
legislation discriminating against Chinese residents of Canada. Starting in
1885, Canada's legislature passed a series of laws imposing a head tax on
persons of Chinese origin who entered the country.20 By 1903, the head tax
.amounted to a prohibitive financial burden, "approximately two years'
wages for a Chinese-Canadian worker at the time." 2' Pursuant to this
statute, the Canadian government collected over 20,000,000 Canadian
dollars on a tax that was imposed on no portion of Canada's population
19. Mack v. Canada (Attorney General), 120011 55 O.R.3d 113 (Ont. Super. Ct.), aff'd [20021
60 O.R.3d 765 (Ont. App. Ct.); leave to appeal ref!usedby [20031 217 D.L.R. (4th) 583.
1885, ch. 71, available at
1885, S.C.
20. The Chinese Immigration Act
http//www.asian.ca/law/cial 885.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
21. Factum of the Appellants at 3, Mack v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 60 O.R.3d
765 (Ont. App. Ct.) (No. C36799).
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other than the Chinese.2 2 The original legislation was repealed in 1923 and
replaced by still harsher legislation intended to bar Chinese people from
entering Canada.23 That statute, eventually repealed in 1947,24 removed the
tax, but disqualified the Chinese as candidates.for immigration to Canada. 2'
In 2001, plaintiffs who had paid the tax or whose spouse or parent. had
paid it, sued the Canadian government, seeking to have it held liable for
unjust enrichment, as well for 'harm caused by the separation of family
members and other privations. ' 26 The Ontario Court of Appeal affirmed the
dismissal of the case on, inter alia, the ground that the head tax had been
legal when enacted and applied. 27 Far from defending the substance of the
legislation, however, the court's opinion begins with a statement of regret:
"Canada's treatment of people of Chinese origin ... represents one of the
more notable stains on our minority rights tapestry. 28
The Chinese head tax case, and the theoretical debate in which it
figures, involve the nature and definition of law as related to what may be
called the problem of evil. Professor Raz has expressed this problem as
follows: "[T]he law can be the source of much evil, meaning that evil is
brought about by human beings, but that the law often plays a causal role in
bringing it about, in facilitating its occurrence. 29
The issue came to the foreground in the western world following the
Second World War because of the degeneration of law in Nazi and fascist
states.30 The postwar legal community confronted the problem of fascism
as a problem of law because of law's primacy in Nazi Germany and other
fascist societies in the following ways: (1) Hitler repeatedly proclaimed
that Nazi Germany was a Rechtsstaat, a nation of and under law; France's
collaborationist leader, P~tain, made the same claim for France from 1940
to 1944; (2) Nazi Germany enacted thousands of laws from 1933 to 1945
that legalized the Nazi system of terror; similarly, Vichy France enacted
22. Id.
23. The Chinese Immigration
Act 1923, S.C.
1923, ch. 38, available at
http//www.asiancallaw/cia1923.htm (last visited Apr. 7. 2004); see also Factum of the Appellants,
supra note 21, at 4.
24. The Immigration Act, S.C. 1947, ch. 19, available at http//www.asian.ca/law/ia1947.htm
(last visited Apr. 7. 2004). For a brief history of the legislative intention to bar Chinese people from
Canada, see Mack v. Canada, [20021 60 O.R.3d 765 (Ont. App. Ct.). at
.
25. Factum of the Appellants, supra note 21, at 4.
26. Id.at I.
27. Mack [20021 60 O.R.3d at
52, 54.
28. Id.
at1I.
29. Joseph Raz. About Morality and the Nature of Laiv, 48 AM J. JURIS. I,1n. I (2003).
30. Itearlier had become a central focal point after the First World War. See Berman, supra
note 14; Patrick Thomberry, IsThere a Phoenix inthe Ashes?-International Law and Minority Rights.
15 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 421 (1980) (describing the European political and legal climate after World War I)
(cited by Mack appellants in Factum of the Appellants, supra note 21, at 5).
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hundreds of laws from 1940 to 1944 that legalized its. reign of terror; (3)
Nazi Germany and other fascist judiciaries implemented laws that
undermined the most fundamental, centuries-old, western tenets of what
law is- and means; (4) in doing the latter, the judiciaries legitimated the
subversion and abuse of traditional western notions of law, rather than
upholding them; (5) other legal actors, such as legal scholars and lawyers,
3
1
similarly contributed to the collapse of traditional western notions of law.
The Chinese head tax case demonstrates that this issue remains current.
The plaintiffs' appellate brief discusses the post-war debate, including the
position the German legal scholar Gustav Radbruch developed that evil law
is not law.32 Like some of its fascist counterparts, the discriminatory
Canadian head tax statute reflected the values of a society which
proclaimed equality, but only selectively. The United States also once
preached equality through its Constitution, but not equality for all; it
conveyed values such as due process and equal protection, while
simultaneously disclaiming them by countenancing the extreme degradation
and inhumanity of slavery for a part of its population.3 3
Such selective constitutionalism repeatedly has served to reassure the
privileged portions of the citizenry that theirs is a civilized society. This
reassurance in turn facilitates systemic repression by clothing it in a
constitutionalism that does not apply to all, as though the quality and
character of substantive legal rights were unrelated to their range of
application. An instance of the use of this strategy met with brilliant
success in France during the Second World War under the German
Occupation. The indigenous, collaborationist Vichy government presented
its initial antisemitic laws with explanatory commentary insisting that the
foundational values of France's legal system remained intact, and that the
portion of the population, intrinsically alien to
laws applied only to a certain
34
the national community.
31. See discussion infra Part VI. For a comparison of the legal communities in Germany and
France. arguing that many of the contrasting aspects are attributable to fascism's shorter duration of four
years in France. as contrasted with twelve years in Germany, see Legalization of Racism, supra note 4.
For a comprehensive account and analysis of the law in Vichy France, see RICHARD H. WEISBERG,
VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996).

32. Factum of the Appellants, supra note 21, at M 96-113.
33. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I (stating "[tlhe Citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States) and U.S. CONST. amend. V
(stating no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law") with U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (requiring return of fugitive slaves to
owners) and Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1856) (holding that slaves had no
rights and privileges under the Constitution).
34. This insistence on continuity was in sharp distinction to the Nazi presentation of the
Nuremberg laws, as Nazi rhetoric proudly proclaimed its role as a rupture from the past. With the initial
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Similarly, in apartheid South Africa, as Justice Richard Goldstone has
described it, that country's "very strange" system proclaimed constitutional
law values while simultaneously undermining them in a "mix of a
democratic system for the white minority, and all that that means (regular
elections, changes of government at the polls, a truly independent
judiciary)... side by side with.., increasingly oppressive racist laws. 35
Western democratic constitutionalism gradually and increasingly is
adopting a mandate of inclusiveness, and the Chinese head tax case is
emblematic of contemporary challenges to national pasts occurring in
courts in many parts of the globe. A range of contrasting views has
emerged concerning the proper role of courts, including whether they
should judge history. Thus, one might interpret the Chinese head tax case
principally as a means of seeking redress for a legally cognizable wrong,
unjust enrichment; as a chance to wipe clean an historical slate sullied by
racism; or at least to proclaim a rejection of former Canadian tolerance for
racism.
These contrasting possibilities reflect the contemporary world's
changing perspective of the nature of the judicial mission. In some
countries in recent years, criminal trials have become the arena for a
national re-examination of the state's ideas and ideals of justice and equity.
In France, for example, the postwar generation has insisted on confronting
the Vichy years in the courtroom, by trying individual defendants for
crimes against humanity half a century after the crimes were committed.
Judicial actors, from judges to lawyers to prosecutors to civil plaintiffs,36
have understood, despite disclaimers to the contrary, that these trials are of
a pedagogical and political nature, going far beyond the issue of an
individual defendant's guilt or innocence, and understanding also that the
country was demanding that the courts engage in historical

antisemitic statutes, promulgated in October, 1940, the Vichy French government also stated that Jews
would remain entitled to basic property rights. With the French population's ready agreement to the
legalization of antisemitism, the government dropped this pretense and proceeded to deprive Jews of all
property and, eventually, of all civil rights. For the reassuring language in which the initial statute
appeared when published, see Legalization of Racism. supra note 4, at 9 n.21. The point that legal
rhetoric provided a false sense of legality through continuity with the past is a central theme of Professor
Weisberg. See WEISBERG, supra note 3 1.
35. A Judge Under Apartheid: Conversation with Justice Richard Goldstone. at
htip://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Goldstone/gold-con2.html. (Apr. 14. 1997).
36. In France, civil plaintiffs, parties civiles, are permitted to bring charges in criminal trials.
See CODE DE PROCEDURE PENAL IC. PR. PtN.] art. 85 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CODE OF

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Gerald L. Kock trans. 1973).
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memorialization,
direction, and a rendition, if not a construction, of national
37
identity.
Memorializing the past, taking stock of the present, and devising an
ideology for the future, are not tasks for which the judicial process was
structured, however. Consequently, the burdens placed on the courts have
been numerous and onerous, challenging law's credibility, since the
processes involved in accomplishing what law was not devised or equipped
to do arguably have involved an undermining of some of the foundational
tenets of law. When the guilt of the accused recedes in importance, and the
preconceived pedagogical value of the verdict gains in it, the centrality of
the individual to law erodes, endangering constitutional law's traditionally
mandatory obligation to 38make the criminal trial of a defendant an exclusive
issue of individual guilt.
South Africa avoided some of the strains to which legal systems
elsewhere were subjected in cases with historical-ideological-political
profiles by choosing the extra-judicial format of the Truth and
Reconciliation Hearings. 39 It has been noted that the nature of the forum a
nation chooses to address issues of a rejected national past has much to do
with the particulars of the nation's history and, hence, sensibilities.
Professor Teitel has pointed out in the context of states in transition that, for
example, because post-Communist countries had suffered from the
historical revisionism that Communist governments practiced as part of
their abuse and violation of truth and justice, those countries uniformly
rejected redressing past crimes and offenses through the construction of a
historical narrative along the model of the Truth and Reconciliation
Hearings.40
While Canada is not a transitional state in the sense of having
undergone an official systemic rupture with a past form of government, the
Chinese head tax case arises in the context of a dramatic transition in law's
37. See LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN

THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2001) (arguing in favor of the Holocaust trials as legitimate and
effective). But see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Atoms of the Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 309-20
(2003) (disagreeing with Douglas' conclusions and arguing that the non-judicial purposes of the
Holocaust trials ultimately undermine law's credibility).
38. For an innovative proposal favoring a kind of collective guilt that would lessen the damage
to law to which I refer above, see George P. Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of
Collective Guilt, I I I YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
39. For a discussion of the Truth and Reconciliatipn process in South Africa, see DAVID
DYZENHAUS, JUDGING THE JUDGES. JUDGING OURSELVES: TRUTH, RECONCILIATION
APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER (1998) thereinafter JUDGING THE JUDGES].

AND THE

40. See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 78-79
(2003) (noting that "truth commissions have been of less interest in post-Communist Europe, where the
use of history by various governments was itself a destructive dimension of Communist repression").
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interpretation that gradually has taken place in the period between the
challenged legislation's enactment and the present. Even as it rejected the
plaintiffs' claims, the Court of Appeal asserted its own rejection.-of the
discriminatory legislation.4' In denying the plaintiffs' claims, the court did
not endorse the statute it was upholding, but reasoned that, despite being
onerous, and regardless even of whether it would be deemed legal if
enacted today, the statute had been legal when enacted, and that its initial
legality precluded relief for the plaintiffs.42
This positivistic perspective was a core issue in the debate about law
that followed the Second World War, involving, among others, the British
legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart, and the German legal scholar Gustav
Radbruch.4 3 They debated whether law, enacted pursuant to the procedures
contemplated by the state for the legally effective enactment of law, always
merits being recognized as law, whether it merits the deference due to law
even if it is evil.
Their debate was framed in terms of whether law and morality
necessarily are connected. A distinction made by Joseph Raz clarifies this
issue. Professor Raz points out that law may have a morality that is
systemic, rather than "content-independent," 4 and therefore that law that is
moral in one way may be compatible with individual enacted laws that are
evil. 45 He notes, for example, that one might consider obeying the laws of a
nation to be a moral obligation because the system as a whole merits citizen
support.46 If so, individual legal enactments might be evil without
abrogating either the moral duty to obey, or the morality of the law in the
systemic sense. 47
In the Hart-Radbruch debate, the issue of whether evil law is law or
non-law has been addressed in terms of law's connection to morality
without making the distinction Professor Raz contributes. One side argues
that if the content of a law is immoral, or sufficiently immoral, it is not law,

41. See Mack v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 60 O.R.3d 765 (Ont. App. Ct.). at 52
(noting that the discriminatory head tax laws, once considered constitutional, now represent "one of the
more notable stains" in Canada's treatment of minorities).
42. Id. at 111I, 52.
43. Another major figure in the debate, whom I do not discuss, was Lon Fuller.
44. Raz, supra note 29, at 6.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Professor Raz's example is the converse of Professor Alexy's. presented by Professor
Dyzenhaus. of the state that declares its goal to be the pursuit of injustice. See David Dyzenhaus, The
Juristic Force of Injustice, in CALLING POWER TO ACCOUNT: LAW'S RESPONSE TO PAST INJUSTICE

(David Dyzenhaus & Mayo Moran eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 14. on file with author)
[hereinafter Juristic Force I.
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because law and morality are connected inextricably (Radbruch). 48 The
other side argues that law and morality have no necessary connection, such
that evil law is law, leaving each individual the option to disobey it, but not
to deny its stature as law (Hart).4 9
IV. THE HART-RADBRUCH DEBATE'S ORIGINAL IMPORT

The objectives of the initial participants are relevant, as some of what
seems to be disagreement may be more a reflection of differing goals and
interests. Radbruch was both a German legal scholar and a former Minister
of Justice under the post-World War I Weimar Republic. At the beginning
of the twentieth century, he had been a proponent of the innovative Free
Law School (Freirechtsschule),which, among others, had underscored the
importance of the individual judge in the story of what law is. 50 Radbruch
remained in Germany during the Nazi period, having been dismissed in
1933 from his teaching position, and silenced by Nazi terror, although
physically left undisturbed.51
After the war, Radbruch wanted to do more than provide an intellectual
understanding of how the courts had come to play a craven and disastrous
role in Nazi Germany, even though the judges largely had been the same as
in the pre-Nazi, republican Weimar period. Rather, Radbruch's goal was
instrumentalist: his study of what had gone wrong was intended for the
practical purpose of salvaging law for the future, by devising ways which
would ensure that a humane rule of law would perpetuate itself and
heighten the chances that future judges would resist, rather than join,
tyrants.
Radbruch proposed that judges evaluate, not just apply, enacted law.
Where law was evil, judges should refuse to apply it. Their justification
would be that where enacted law undermines the tenets of justice central to
all law, it does not qualify as being law. This proposal became so widely
48. See Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und Obergesetzliches Recht, I SUDDEUTSCHE
ZEITUNG 105-08 (1946) (F.R.G.), translated in Stanley L. Paulson, Lon L. Fuller. Gustav Radbruch.
and the "Positivist" Theses, 13 L.& PHIL. 313. 317 (1994) (hereinafter Radbruch). The view that law
and morality were inextricably related was shared by Lon Fuller, with whom Hart debated the issue of
positivism and natural law. But see Juristic Force, supra note 47, at 40 (suggesting that Fuller believed
there was a similarity between the Hart and Radbruch positions as "both resort to the idea of higher law
in order to deal with the problems created by past legal injustice").
49. See H.L.A. HART., Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, in ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 49-87 (1983).
50. See GNAEUS FLAVIUS [pseudonym for Hermann Kantorowicz], DER KAMPF UM DIE
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT at vii-ix (Heidelberg 1907) (1906).
51. 4 20TH CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES:
RADBRUCH. AND DABIN 44 (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950).
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accepted in postwar Germany that it is known today as "Radbruch's
formula. 52
Radbruch's proposal stemmed from his view that legal positivism had
been to blame for the German judges' readiness to implement Nazi law
without evaluation, and for the courts' failure to resist legal enactments that
were contrary to fundamental principles of law. 53 Moreover, he believed
that the judges' positivism: namely, their relegating their judicial mission to
a mere application of enacted law, whatever it was, so long as it had been
enacted in accordance with the contemplated procedures for governmental
enactment of legislation, stemmed from their training in law school to do
precisely that.5 4 He believed the entire German legal system and legal
history had converged in telling judges that their task was to apply enacted
55
law mechanically, rather than to evaluate it.
H.L.A. Hart strenuously disagreed with Radbruch's idea that evil law
does not constitute law. Unlike Radbruch, however, Hart's focus and
objectives were not oriented principally toward a pragmatic societal goal of
justice. Instead, Hart's goal was to maintain and hone intellectual,
conceptual clarity and accuracy, and the thrust of his criticism of Radbruch
was that Radbruch's incorrect tying of law and morality would muddy the
waters for legal analysis if it were accepted. 56
Hart and Radbruch's differing objectives have much to do with the
respective substantive positions in the debate. The issue of nomenclature or
definition was crucial for Hart, to avoid conceptual confusion that would
endanger legal philosophy. Hart asserted this explicitly: "The vice of this
use of the principle that, at certain limiting points, what is utterly immoral
cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to cloak the true nature of the
problems. . ..
As I have stated elsewhere, my sense is that Radbruch's
interest in nomenclature was not inherently incompatible with Hart's view
so much as it was a strategic decision based on the belief that naming
something law or non-law would have a beneficial effect on the behavior of
58
judges, and lessen their propensity to be complicit in evil law.
'

52. See Radbruch. supra note 48, at 317-18.
53. H.L.A. Hart. Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593,617
(1958).
54. See Radbruch, supra note 48.

55. Peter Caldwell, Legal Positivism and Weimar Democracy, 39 AM. J.JURIS. 273, 273-75.
56. See HART, supra note 49.

57. Id. at 77.
58. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period in
France and Germany of Judicial Methodology's Impact on Substantive Law. 35 CORNELL INT'L L.

101. 135 (2002) [hereinafter Fear of Formalism].
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Radbruch's call to define law so that evil legislation does not qualify as
law generally has been seen as a return to natural law. In the debate about
evil law, Radbruch's position is closer to one of modified positivism, or, as
Professor Dyzenhaus puts it, Radbruch's perspective is "positivism with a
minus sign." 59 Radbruch's argument may best be seen as the blend of
positivism and natural law that had characterized his perspective since at
least the early 1900s when he espoused Free Law, in that he emphasizes
that the norm should remain for judges to apply legislation in deference to
the will of the legislature, and that only a very high degree or quantity of
departure from fundamentals of justice may permit, but also must oblige,
judges to reject enacted law as non-law.6 °
In addition, Radbruch's idea of "non-law" bespeaks positivism, rather
than natural law, in that only by denying the name of law, only once a judge
has decided that a text does not qualify as law, can a judge- reject the text.
This means that the duty always is to apply enacted law inasmuch as evil
enacted law no longer is called law. In that sense, Radbruch elevates the
judge to critic and evaluator of the legislator, but relegates the judge to the
servitude of the legislator for all that is bona fide "law."
It is important to note that Radbruch's proposal never involves a judge
who disobeys enacted law, but only a judge who obeys all enacted law that
can qualify as law. Since non-law is not law, the judge confronted with
non-law has no obligation to give effect to such a text. This may seem no
more paradoxical than the role of judges in judicial review, especially in
common-law systems where the reviewing court is adjudicating cases in
controversy, and is not occupied exclusively with judging the legality of
enacted law, such that judges continually experience the duality of applying
and deferring to legislation, but also adjudicating the viability of legislation.
Radbruch insisted on this dual function, whose alien nature to
continental European civil-law systems may be reflected by the fact that
when constitutional review was instituted in continental European systems
after the war, it generally was in the form of special constitutional courts,
such that some judges became superior to the legislature to the extent that
they had the last word on the legality of enacted law, but those judges,
unlike their common-law counterparts, did nothing other than adjudicate
issues of constitutionality.
All the rest of the civil-law judges, in all but the one, exceptional
constitutional court, remained subservient to the legislature, and were
59. JuristicForce, supra note 47, at 15.

60. Free law theory, sometimes blamed for making a king of the judge ("Richterk6nig"), in fact
said that the judge's task was to form rules only when "the formal law has a gap." Hermann
Kantorowicz. Some RationalismAbout Realism, 43 YALE L. J. 1240, 1244 (1934).
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obliged to apply the law, rather than to determine its validity. Radbruch's
idea was different: not to divide the judges between those who evaluated
enacted law and the rest who applied it, but, on the contrary, to insist on the
evaluative obligation of all judges in all courts, within the context of their
obligation of deference until and unless enacted law reached so high a
degree of departure from fundamental tenets of law as to require judges to
reject and to classify it as being outside the category of law.
Radbruch's blend of natural law and positivism also lies at the core of
the idea he explained as a higher law to which the judiciary remains the
servant: a concept of law known in German as "Recht," in French as
"droit," and in Latin as ' Jus." Their etymologies link the denoted concepts
to the English-language concepts of "right" and "justice." As Hobbes
explained,
LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule,
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that,
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of
preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinketh it
may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this
subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law: yet they
ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to
do, or to forbear: whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one
of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and
liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.6'

A

In Hart's eyes, the problem with Radbruch's blend of natural law with
positivism was a conceptual confusion. Radbruch had constructed a way to
cast judges who rejected evil law as not disobeying it, by virtue of first
disqualifying it. Hart had no objection to Radbruch's goal of heightening
morality in society so long as, contrary to Radbruch's proposal, one did do
it by disobeying law one considered evil. 62 According to Hart, such
disobedience was the better route because it would not interfere with
retaining the category of law for all texts generated by legislatures
according to recognized procedure.63
Often considered simply and directly to be a reaction against Nazism,
Radbruch's view was something else. It was part of the theoretical outlook
of the Free Law School that Radbruch had helped found, and whose date of
origin generally is associated with the 1906 publication of its manifesto:

61.

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 84 (Oxford 1960) (165 1).

62. See HART, supra note 49. at 75.
63. Id.at 75-78.
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Hermann Kantorowicz's Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaf.6" Later,
simplistically and occasionally ignorantly blamed for its allegedly
positivistic foreshadowing of Nazism, the Free Law theory embodied a
subtle, complex, and visionary perspective that combined aspects of
positivism and natural law, a theory Arnold Brecht aptly described as
"neutral relativ[ism]. 65 Indeed, Free Law theory corresponds in depth and
perspective to Cassirer's political philosophy.
Radbruch's "formula" testifies both to a strong strain of positivism and
to continuity in his own legal theory (as I have argued previously and as
often is disputed by readers of Radbruch who believe that Nazism changed
him from a positivist to a natural-law theoretician). 66 The blend of natural
law with positivism that was intrinsic to the Free Law School's tenets also
is explicit in Radbruch's correspondence with Hermann Kantorowicz,
principal founder of the Free Law School, and a colleague from youth with
whom Radbruch loyally remained in contact after Kantorowicz emigrated
to England.6 7
V. WHY THE DEBATE MATTERS TODAY

If the positivism debate concerns us today, it should be for a reason,
and the reason may influence the nature or appeal of the arguments we
make or accept. The Hart-Radbruch debate is relevant today because of the
continuation in the postwar world of evil law, and the pressing urgency
legal scholars (and others) experience to marshal law as a force of

64. See FLAVIUS, supra note 50.
65. Arnold Brecht, The Myth ofls and Ought, 54 HARV. L. REV. 811, 824 (1941). For the Free
Law School's views on natural law, see Vivian Grosswald Curran. Rethinking Hermann Kantorowicz:
Free Lair American Legal Realism and the Legacy of Anti-Formalism, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 66, 79-80 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) Ihereinafter Rethinking Hermann
Kantorowicz].

See also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law:

Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 110-I1
(2001 ) [hereinafter Romantic Common Law1.
66. See Rethinking Hermann Kantorowicz, supra note 65, at 86.
67. See unpublished letter from Hermann Kantorowicz to Gustav Radbruch(Feb. 28, 1906) (on
file with the author) (as reprinted for author by Frank Carter, son of Hermann Kantorowicz, and
published here with his kind permission).
Im ersten Teit weist er die Existenz von nichtstaatlichem freien' Rechte nach und
naehert sich insofern dem alten Naturrecht. trennt sich aber von diesem unter
anderm dadurch. dass er die Moeglichkeit bestreitet, jeden Rechtsfall rechtlich zu
entscheiden. Diesem, jeder Dogmatik abholden Standpunki gemaess. :erpflueckt
er im ziveitem Teite die herrschenden juristischen Methoden, ivobei er jedoch
betont. sich mehr gegen die Theorie zu wenden als gegen die Praxis, die schon
bisher meist instinktiv das Richtige getroffen habe.
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humanity.
These contemporary objectives are instrumentalist, like
Radbruch's.
The instrumentalist nature of today's enterprise does not imply that one
necessarily would reject Hart's objections if they are justified. If Hart was
right that even evil law is law, it may be that to argue otherwise may not
advance an instrumentalist goal. On the other hand, if the contexts of the
Hart-Radbruch positions are sufficiently disparate, it may be that each has
validity within a separate contextual framework. For the reasons stated
previously in this Article and confirmed from the historical account
presented below, it is unlikely that a rejection of positivism will do much to
further the goal of making law a force for, rather than against, justice
In the modem era, apartheid South Africa illustrates the continuation of
the problem Radbruch sought to address and solve. Some have suggested
that the South African judiciary might have defeated apartheid from the
68
bench had it adopted a Radbruchian approach adapted to the common law.
The suggestion is that principles of equity and "ordinary common law
presumptions of statutory interpretation" contain within themselves the
avenue for enabling judges to navigate the perilous waters evil legislation
creates for adjudication.69
Professor Dyzenhaus presents this equity approach as one of a higher
order of law, similar to the contrast Radbruch signaled between the lowerorder enacted law ("Gesetz") and the higher-order natural-law system of
law and justice ("Recht").70 Without entering into the debate as to whether
the higher-order law in common-law legal systems necessarily harks to
human-wide universal principles, Professor Dyzenhaus theorizes that they
are implicit in the organic components of common-law legal systems in
general, and of the South African one in particular.
Also along the lines of Radbruch's division of law into Gesetz and
Recht, with the latter trumping the former where otherwise the two would
be in mutual contradiction, Professor Dyzenhaus suggests that South
African judges could have shown deference to inalterable constitutive
principles of justice, which in principle enjoyed a long and established
tradition of judicial recognition. According to Professor Dyzenhaus, that
would have enabled and, indeed, required the judges to interpret any legal
text in such a manner that would render it compatible with the demands of
the higher order of law. In particular, statutes repressive of black South

68. See JUDGING THE JUDGES. supra note 39, at 150-5 I.
69. Id. at 75.
70. Id. at 74-75.

Racism's Past and Law's Future

2004)

Africans could and should have been denuded of discrimination in their
judicial interpretation and implementation. 7'
Professor Dyzenhaus' idea echoes United States constitutional law
interpretation, where the Supreme Court whenever possible must interpret
statutes so as to render them constitutional. 2 This doctrine has dual
significance: (I) the triumph of constitutional values and guarantees over
legislation that would undermine individual rights; and (2) the promotion of
judicial deference to legislation inasmuch as the doctrine seeks to retain
enacted law rather than to reject it.
Professor Dyzenhaus' book on the South African judiciary focuses
mostly on liberal judges, and reflects his judgment that they could and
should have done better.73 The presence of rules of equity in South Africa's
common-law system provided a mechanism by which the judiciary could
have nullified racist apartheid legislation. Given the overall poor showing
of South African judges during apartheid, despite their operating in a
system recognizing principles of equity, the crucial issue for assessing the
pragmatic potential of legal theory and methodology is whether a judiciary
more strongly trained to look beyond the letter of enacted law would have
done better.
Radbruch's work reflects an intense admiration for the common law
system, and the belief that built-in attributes of the common-law system
have an immunizing effect against judicial enablement of evil. But South
Africa's history under apartheid may be the counterexample to disprove
Radbruch, inasmuch as Radbruch suggests that the presence of the
common-law characteristics suffices to fortify the judiciary against
legislative disruptions of the rule of law.
Radbruch so admired the common law that he believed positivism
itself to be contextual in valence, and negative only in civil-law legal
systems. He wrote that only in civilian legal systems did positivism
correspond to judicial subservience to enacted law.74 He believed that in
common-law legal systems positivism was an affirmation of "Recht," the

71. See id. at 74 (quoting judges who admitted that they deferred to legislation rather than
apply equitable principles).

72. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d ed. 2003) ("IClourts are
supposed to choose the interpretation that avoids rather than invites the constitutional infirmity."); see
also id. at 92 n.6 (citing WtI.LIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL.. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 87389 (3d ed. 2001)) ("This canon of interpretation is based on a desire to avoid unnecessary friction
between the legislative and judicial branches.").
73. JUDGING TIlE JUDGES, supra note 39.
74.

GUSTAV RADBRUCH, DER GEIST DES ENGLISCHEN RECIITS (1946).
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supra-enactment.idea; of law that includes justice. 75 He said that positivism
in common-law systems was a "Bejahung des Rechts," an
76
assertion/affirmation: of law in the supra-statutory, law-as-justice, sense.
Radbruch explicitly associated common-law methodology with England
and the United States' freedom from tyranny and the historically unbroken
perpetuation of the rule of law in both those countries. In particular, his
book, Der Geist des englischen Rechts, published in 1949, sets forth the
common law for German readers with unabashed admiration, as though the
defining fundamentals of the system were causally related to the
perpetuation of the rule of law.77 .
As the history of apartheid South Africa's courts makes clear, however,
the common-law attributes of equity historically have proved insufficient in
correlating judicial interpretation of enacted law with a humane rule of law.
David Fraser's work on the British legal system's vulnerability to fascist
enactments in the Channel Islands also offers a powerful argument to the
contrary, rendering highly unlikely Radbruch's conclusion that the
American and British common-law system's differentiating aspects from
the civil-law have allowed those countries to avoid fascism. Professor
Fraser's book, The Jews of the Channel Islands and the Rule of Law, 19401945, has a subtitle of manifest relevance to the present discussion: "Quite
contrary to the principlesof Britishjustice."'8
Professor Fraser. recounts the vulnerability of law to fascist ideology
and legislation in the British Channel Islands of Guernsey and Jersey under
German Occupation. 79 The common-law judiciaries complied and, much
like the common-law judiciary of South Africa, docilely applied enacted
law without reconciling it with such principles of equity as might have
precluded racial discrimination and persecution.80 Professor Fraser writes
that, "[w]hile the scale of the phenomenon can in no way be compared to
the jurisprudence in France under the two Statuts des Juifs, the juridical

75. See HART, supra note 49, at 74 (noting that Radbruch believed "that the fundamental
principles of humanitarian morality were part of the very concept of Recht or Legality and that no
positive enactment or statute, however clearly it was expressed and however clearly it conformed with
the formal criteria of validity of a given legal system, could be valid if it contravened basic principles of
morality").
76. See RADBRUCH, supra note 74, at 49 (1946); Gustav Radbruch, Anglo-American
Jurisprudence Through Continental Eyes, 52 L. Q. REv. 530 (1936) (extolling the common law).
77. RADBRUCH. supra note 74.
78. DAVID FRASER, THE JEWS OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS AND THE RULE OF LAW, 1940-1945:
QUITE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH JUSTICE (2000).

79. Id. at[.
80. See id. at 7-8.
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and exclusion [of the Jews of the
nature of the process of identification
81
Channel Islands was] similar."
If the principles of equity or constitutionalism that the common-law
systems possess might enable resistance to evil law, but historically. have
not done so, the problem might be that the judiciaries have not been
inculcated sufficiently to prioritize those principles in the process of
adjudication. In that case, it might be that greater emphasis on the need for
judges to accord primacy to equity principles might cause judges to uphold,
rather than subvert, a humane rule of law where enacted law is evil.
An examination of the German and French courts during fascism casts
doubt on the causal relation between actual judicial justice and emphasizing
such legal theory in adjudication. While legal theory and methodology may
prove useful as a tool for a judge to reach a humane decision if the judge is
so inclined, twentieth-century history suggests that dissociating law from
evil does not lie in inculcating the judiciary with a theory or methodology.
History indicates that neither can be formulated so as to erode reliably the
judicial tendency to apply, legitimate, and enable evil legislation.
VI. THE TELLING STORY OF FRENCH AND GERMAN COURTS DURING
NAZISM AND FASCISM

The common law's constitutional and equity principles have a
counterpart in civil law systems. These are the general principles (principes
gingraux) of France, and the general clauses (Generalklauseln) of
Germany. Germany and France were two countries whose judiciaries
enabled a reign of terror under Hitler and PMtain. Like common-law
principles of equity and constitutionalism, general principles and general
clauses are judicial doctrines that allow judges to adjudicate under the spirit
of the nation's law while interpreting specific legislation. In the words of
two French scholars, French general principles allow "the introduction into
positive law of moral rules or of principles of natural law." 82 They further
explain these principles as a dimension of "fairness," using the
untranslatable English word in the original.83 The German equivalent, the
general clauses, has been described as popular in Germany in order to
further the judiciary's Rechtsgefiihl: its sense/feeling for law in the sense of

81. Id. at37.
82. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITt
GENERALE 338 (1977).

83. Id. at 339.
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law-and-justice.8' Thus, similarly to common-law judiciaries, civil-law
judiciaries have, and at all relevant times have had, a mechanism by which
judges may mold enacted law on a procrustean bed of justice.
Since the presence of such mechanisms in common-law systems has
not been enough to ensure that judges use them to overcome and neutralize
evil legislation, it might be (as we also postulated with respect to the
common law) that effective use of these mechanisms requires a judiciary to
be inculcated as to the necessity of their use. An examination of the
judiciaries in Nazi Germany and Vichy France suggests the contrary.
Radbruch's blaming judicial positivism for the reign of terror which
the Nazi courts enabled overlooked the fact that the traditional judicial
positivism of Germany had ended well before Hitler came to power.
Germany had indeed embraced judicial positivism at one time, with slogans
such as "enacted law is enacted law" ("Gesetz ist Gesetz"), and a theory
85
known as "enacted law/statutory positivism" ("Gesetzespositivismus").
These doctrines had given way to increasing judicial activism before
1933. As Ingeborg Maus has noted, judicial activism and anti-positivism
became the primary way for Germany's nationalistic and conservative
judges to fight the Weimar laws they held in contempt.8 6 Although
Germany's judges appear to have felt greater sympathy for Hitler's r6gime
than for the Weimar Republic, they continued their anti-positivistic
methodology under Hitler: "National Socialism did not counteract the
tendency to 'deformalize' law through the use of 'general clauses' instead
of specific statutes, but actually strengthened it." 87T Thus, the German
judicial rejection of positivism that predated Nazism continued throughout
the Hitler period.8 8 It was a non-positivistic judiciary that legitimated,
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85. See Fearof Formalism, supranote 58, at 151-66 (examining positivism in Germany before
World War II).
86. See lngeborg Maus, "Gesetzesbindung" der Justiz und die Struktur der
nationalsozialistischenRechtsnormen, in RECHT UND JUSTIZ IM "DRITTEN REICH" 87 (Ralf Dreier &
Wolfgang Sellert eds., 1989).

87. Caldwell, supra note 55, at 276.
88. This statement should be read in light of (and as qualified by) the AMethodendualismus of
the Nazi period, in which the courts interpreted enacted law liberally or strictly, selecting the
methodology most likely to further Nazi ideology. See ERNST FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE: A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP (E.A. Shils et al. trans., Oxford University Press
1941) (providing first-hand description of National-Socialist legal system in Germany); ROTHERS, supra
note 84, at 177; Arthur Kaufmann, National Socialism and German Jurisprudence from 1933-1945, 9
CARDOZO L. REv. 1629 (1988) (recounting the law's transformation under Nazi rule).
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enabled and implemented Hitler's reign of terror.8 9 This alone suffices to
indicate that the rejection of positivism is not a prescription for maintaining
law's refusal to endorse evil.
The conclusion is further fortified by contrast between the judicial
methodologies of France and Germany under fascist law. While German
judges were not positivistic, French judges were, and yet the judiciaries of
both countries were similarly complicit in implementing law that Radbruch
said was too evil to merit the name of law. 90 The continental European
legal tradition of positivism historically had been shared by France and
Germany, albeit under somewhat different forms.
Most continental
European legal systems were more positivistic than their common-law
counterparts, especially when one considers that the core of positivism is
judicial application of legislative enactment and that all law in continental
Europe was written law, while in the common-law tradition, the norm was
for law to be judge-made, with statutory law the exception. 9 1
The German and French judicial traditions developed in starkly
contrasting manners before the advent of Nazism, however. In France, the
judiciary became hated before the Revolution for its abuse of power. Prerevolutionary judges had been able to issue orders arbitrarily and without
being obliged to articulate a legal basis for their decisions. 92 They could
leave their judgeships to their children by will, or sell them during their lifetime.93 By the eighteenth century, the judiciary also had become a powerful
counterpoint to the monarchy.94 The confluence of this dual tradition of
judicial abuse and of judicial opposition to the government caused a binary
anti-judicial reaction by France's revolutionaries, consisting of both hatred
and fear.95 The revolutionaries' loathing of judges had its antecedents in the
history of corruption and abuse by the judiciary, as their fear did in the role
that the judges had played in overthrowing the monarchy, causing the

89. See Paulson's comment in Radbruch. supra note 48, at 315 ("the exoneration thesis [i.e.,
exoneration of German judges by blaming the theory of positivism for judicial injustice] has been
substantially discredited").
90. This argument is the principal theme of my article. Fear of Formalism. supra note 58.
91. See Romantic Common Law, supra note 65, at 120-26 (exploring the implications of the
common- and civil-law methodologies within the context of the European Union).
92. See JOHN P. DAWSON. THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 321-22 ("None of the [judges'I decrees
expressed any reasons.").

93. See id. at 351-54 (describing the origin and evolution of the sale of judicial offices in preRevolution France).
94. See DAVID A. BELL, LAWYERS AND CITIZENS: THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL ELITE IN OLD
REGIME FRANCE 15 (1994).

95. See DAWSON, supra note 92, at 375-79 (describing the methods the revolutionary
assemblies employed to subjugate the judiciary).
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the potential to overthrow the new
Jacobins to fear judges for having
96
also.
government
revolutionary
While the power French judges actually wield has been a subject of
heated debate through the years, they have been relegated officially to a
position of inferiority within the scheme of governmental powers. Judges
themselves have complied with that official relegation, in at least surface
agreement. Ironically, it was precisely the use of equity and liberal
interpretive methodology in the pre-revolutionary judiciary that spawned a
reaction in the French legal mentality against it by associating equity with
injustice and positivism with justice.97
French judges officially are limited to applying enacted law, not
creating it. Their decisions reflect their self-understanding of their duty to
apply legislation without evaluating it. The French Civil Code continues to
this day to forbid judges from making law. 98 Not surprisingly, the French
judiciary, unlike the German one, did not apply general principles openly
because the judges had been trained to reject judicial freedom of
interpretation.99 The traditional French rejection of general principles and
adherence to positivism has been associated with a French judicial
"aversion for all that is hazy or flexible."' 00
The German tradition included no similar animus against the judiciary
and, by the time of its enabling of Nazi law, no similar adherence to legal
positivism. On the contrary, as Professor Dawson put it, Germany's judges
proudly considered themselves to be the conscience of their nation and
gradually acquired increasing interpretive freedom.' 0 '

96. See id. (detailing the revolutionaries' attempts to subordinate the broad powers of the
judiciary to the legislature); see also Jacqueline Hodgson, Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in
French Criminal Justice: Some Empirical Observations, 29 J.L. & SOC'Y. 227 (2002) (explaining the
French Revolutionaries' motives).
97. See ANDRt DESSANS. ESSAI SUR LA NOTION D'tQUITI 138-39 (1934) (describing "la
rdactiondes hommes de la Rdvolution contre I'arbitrairedesjuges de I'ancien rigime .... le juge est
[dis lors] dans / obligation de survie de la loi 6 la letire .. . il y avait dans cette attitude une rdaction
contre une abusive jurisprudence dt'Equiti, qui avail [eu] pour effet defaire vivre au milieu de la socidti
comme si elle diait sans lois").
98. CODE CIVIL IC. clv] art. 5 (Fr.) (II est ddfendu aux juges de prononcer par voie de
disposition gndrale et rdglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises.").
99. For a more detailed discussion, see Fear of Formalism. supra note 58. at 141-51
(examining the doctrine of principes giniraux and the French judiciary's reluctance to resist specific
enacted law).
100. Guiseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and Politics in the
Life of the European Court ofJustice, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397.400 (1995).
101. John P. Dawson, The General Clauses, I"iewedfrom a Distance. 41 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT
441 (1977); see also Franz L. Neumann, The Decay of German Democracy, in THE RULE OF LAW
UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER 29, 36-37 (William

E. Scheuerman ed.. 1996) (describing role ofjudiciary in Germany before Hitler).
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Indeed, the German judiciary made increasing use of "general clauses"
("Generalklauseln"). According to Franz Wieacker,
it was impossible even before 1933 to infer from the text of the
[German Civil] Code what the law actually was.... This
achievement was effected quietly, unobserved by the general
public, and it is still generally underestimated ... partly because
the courts today0 2seldom refer to it, although they continue in the
same tradition.1

In 1968, Bernd Rfithers documented the anti-positivism of Germany's
judiciary during the Nazi era in a groundbreaking, compellingly persuasive
and comprehensive analysis.'0 3 More recent German scholarship by
Michael Stolleis, lngeborg Maus, and Ingo MUller has continued to
document the10 4German judiciary's anti-positivism both before and during the
Nazi period.
An illustration of the contrast between German and French courts can
be seen in the 1920s private law cases that arose in both countries as a result
of rampant inflation. In order to effect justice, the German courts were
willing to change numbers set forth in absolute terms in contracts because
they felt obliged to rescue from financial ruin contracting parties who
otherwise would be victimized
by the changed value of Mark amounts that
10 5
inflation had wrought.
By contrast, when French courts were faced with similar cases they
refused such judicial legerdemain, and their decisions became known under
the slogan of "a franc is a franc" ("unfranc est unfranc").' 6 These cases
102. FRANZ WIEACKER. A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE 409-10 (Tony Weir trans.,
1995); see also Folke Schmidt, The Ratio Decidendi: A Comparative Study of a French, a German and
an American

Supreme

Court

Decision,

VI ACTA

INSTITUTI

UPSALIENSIS

IURISPRUDENTIAE

COMPARATIVAE 3, 5 (1965) (comparing specific decisions that illustrate American implementation of
state case law and French and German professed implementation of enacted law); JUSTUS WILHELM
HEDEMANN, DIE FLUCHT IN DIE GENERALKLAUSELN: EINE GEFAHR FOR RECHT UND STAAT (1933)
(analyzing the use of "'Generalklauseln"in the German judiciary in the early twentieth century).
103. See ROTHERS,supra note 84, at 1-12.
104. See MICHAEL STOLLEIS, THE LAW UNDER THE SWASTIKA: STUDIES ON LEGAL HISTORY IN

NAZI GERMANY (Thomas Dunlap trans., 1998) (describing the interrelation between law and justice in
the Nazi system); Maus, supra note 86. at 93 (referring to declaration by Germany's judicial association,
the Richterbund, in 1920 that judges should not have any "keine unnotige Bindung" ("unnecessary
bond") with enacted law).
105. See ROTHERS. supra note 84, at 213 et seq. (describing the definition and use of general
clauses in German courts during National Socialism). See generally John P. Dawson, Specific
Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 495 (1959).
106. See generally JACQUES FLOUR & JEAN-LUc AUBERT, LES OBLIGATIONS: I. LACTE
JURIDIQUE (1998); FRANCOIS TERRE. INTRODUCTION GENtRALE AU DROIT (4"' ed. 1998).
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reflect the German court tradition of interpretive liberty and the contrasting
French court tradition of mechanical application of enacted law without
evaluation. The German courts applied general clauses to circumvent
legally binding text. The French courts refused to apply general principles
to do the same. 0 7 Despite these different methodologies, the judiciaries of
both countries applied and enabled Nazi and fascist law. Thus, the
interpretive freedom of Germany's judiciary does not bode any better than
the positivistic perspective of France's judiciary for the human valence of a
system that stresses judicial evaluation and interpretation over mechanical
application of enacted law.
Moreover, in both France and Germany, the bulk of statutory law dated
from the prior regimes. While Hitler and P6tain enacted many new laws,
they did not repeal most prior laws, even those that contradicted the new
laws. Consequently, when judges applied discriminatory laws to the
detriment of an individual, they were ignoring and refusing to apply other
statutes, not merely the general, abstract principles embodied in general
clauses or principles, but also concrete enacted laws, that guaranteed to
those individuals the very rights the courts participated in destroying.
Professor Rtthers offers an illustration of one such situation in Nazi
Germany. The first article of the German Civil Code defined the human
being as acquiring basic legal capacity ("Rechtsfahigkeit") by virtue of
having been born.10 8 Hitler had not repealed the Civil Code, so Nazi legal
scholars showed judges a way to deprive Jews of their Article I legal
capacity despite the Civil Code's continued legal effectiveness. They did
this by analogizing Jews to the dead, reasoning that all laws had to be read
in accordance with the guiding spirit of the nation's law (Recht); namely,
the racial principles of blood and race. Accordingly, only members of the
allegedly racially pure German Volk were deemed to be living for purposes
of qualifying for legal benefits. 10 9 As Hitler already had decreed that Jews
were barred irremediably by reason of race and blood from belonging to the
German Volk, the scholars reasoned that by analogy Jews should be deemed
0
disqualified from a legal capacity conveyed by virtue of birth. 11
The law offered German and French judges under Hitler and P6tain
many choices. They decided in each case which among many, often

107. French courts began to use general principles with less hesitation after the Second World
War in reaction to the Vichy judges who had applied inhumane law, but resistance to using the
principles remains strong to this day and the issue is heavily debated in French legal scholarship.
108. See ROTHERS, supra note 84, at 325-29 (describing the origin and development of
"RechIsfchigkeit ").
109. /d.at 323-35.
110. See id.at 323-29.
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mutually contradictory enacted laws to apply, and whether to apply that law
strictly or liberally. It took considerable judicial interpretive freedom to
apply Article I as the German judiciary did under Hitler, as guided by the
Nazi legal scholars. This example demonstrates that departure from the
plain meaning of enacted law can allow judges to legalize discrimination
and persecution, just as adherence to plain meaning can achieve the same
result.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the differences distinguishing the common law from
the civil law-such as the common law's long tradition of recognizing
principles of equity or constitutional principles, whether in written or
unwritten constitutional law-have not protected common-law nations from
judicial implementation of evil enacted law, such as the laws of apartheid or
the Nazi laws of the Channel Islands. However, common-law principles
still might hold the key to judicial justice if the problems of the past lay in
an insufficient emphasis on those principles in the process of adjudication.
We saw that such an emphasis existed in the very system that caused
the widespread post-Second World War disavowal of judicial positivismNazi Germany, where German courts continued their pre-war tradition of
liberal interpretation. The mechanism they used was the general clause, a
concept with many similarities for our purposes to common-law principles
of equity and constitutional law concepts.
In interpreting law liberally, Germany's judges served Hitler's
ideology all the more effectively. In fact, they interpreted enacted law
liberally when liberal interpretation furthered Nazi ideology, and strictly
when strict interpretation furthered it. In France, on the other hand, the
courts during fascism continued their time-honored positivism. This
included the French judicial rejection of general principles, the equivalent
of Germany's general clauses.
Thus, the presence of supra-statutory legal norms of constitutional law,
equity, or guiding principles of a nation's legal spirit have been present
within all legal systems, and they have been effective in none in preventing
judiciaries from engaging in the legalization of reigns of terror. Even the
judicial emphasis on interpretive freedom from the concrete terms of
enacted law not only proved ineffectual, but in Nazi Germany was the very
tool courts used to undermine principles of human dignity and justice.
As the Free Law School that Radbruch helped to found affirmed, the
quality of law.depends on the quality of judges. The space in which legal
theory and methodology have pragmatic influence is that space in which
they influence the judges' values, beliefs and views of justice and
legitimacy. To the extent that law, legal theory and methodology transmit
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underlying values of inclusiveness and fairness, judges may choose to use
the legal mechanisms that are available in all systems to refuse enacted law
that deprives people of fundamental rights.
If history has made one case compellingly, it is that we depend on the
right judges being in place at the right time, and on their courage and
vision. Consequently, we depend on the panoply of composite elements
that Cassirer called the "constitution that is written in [their] minds." Much
of the rest can be subsumed under what .motivated the postwar's
culpabilization of positivism, and the return to natural law. The resumption
of natural law theory reversed a trend away from natural law that had been
taking place since the time of Kant. It is part of an age-old wish to scientize
law, which in turn is part of the wish to believe that in a correct formulation
of law, of legal theory, and of legal methodology, if only we can reach the
correct formulation, if only we can discover it and implement it, lies
humanity's salvation through judicially enforced justice and civilization.
More simply put, much of the rest is illusion.

